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Introduction 
Why is it importam to study politicians' perceptions of populism? The 
way in which something is regarded and understood is of the utmost 
importance for its impact on politics and society in general. Given the 
complexities in defining 'populism' and understanding its meaning, and 
in view of it being commonly referred to as a 'vague', 'slippery', 'elusive' 
concept (e.g., Canovan, 1981, 1984; Taggart, 2000; Barr, 2009; Lucardie, 
2009; Woods, 2014), this study addresses the concept and its potential 
implications through the views of politicians who represent some of the 
most importam politicaI parties in 11 European countries and who are 
therefore important opinion-makers. The main objective is to discern 
what politicians from the various countries and different types of politi-
cai parties understand by populism and how they perceive the causes and 
implications of these phenomena in their countries, and, more broadly, 
in European and global contexts. 
Interviews were conducted with politicians from 11 European countries: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, ltaly, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The sample is therefore 
composed of countries representing different regions in Europe, including 
from Southeastern, Eastern, Central, Northern, and Southern Europe. The 
politicai parties were selected taking into account their overall electaral 
expression in their respective countries and their representativeness on the 
right-Ieft politicai spectrum. ln addition, populist and non-populist par-
ties were included in alI countries, except Romania. The study therefore 
includes a varied sample of politicaI parties, including mainstream and 
fringe, center-Ieft and center-right, radical and/or extreme left and right, 
and populist and non-populist parties (for further information about the 
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research decisions and the methodological approach, see the chapter by 
Salgado and Stanyer in this volume).4 
This chapter is divided into five main sections which correspond with 
the five main topics addressed in the interviews with politicians, namely: 
'What do you understand by populism?', 'What are the consequences of 
populism?', 'What explains the p pu larity of populist leaders and par-
ties?', 'What social issues are mo t related to populism?', and 'What role 
do the media play in populism?' 
What Do You Understand by Populism? 
For several years, populism in Europe was a ~ynonym for far-right par-
ties and closely related to the issues of immigJ;ation, law and order, and 
often also nationalism (see Mudde, 2004, 2007; Jagers & Walgrave, 
2007; Rydgren, 2017). The Euro crisis and the emergence of success-
fui social movements, which in some cases evolved into politicai parties 
(e.g., Podemo Syriza), launched the discussion regarding what popu-
lism mcan and what it is in Europe currently. The fact that Podemos, 
for example, identifies itself as a populist party, is extremely interesting 
(see Sanders, Molina, & Zoragastua, 2017), since often even commonly 
labeled populist parties avoid the denomination due to its negative con-
notation in European politics. 
ln th' study, we eek to leam more about what politician l'ecogl1iz 
as popllli fi and how they pel'ceive thi phenomel1on today. Tbe sa mple 
included a variety of counr.ries Erom differ nt European r gions and politi-
cians representing various politicai parties with different politicai orienta-
tions, including populist and non-poplllist parties. Both the descriptions 
and the examples given by politicians in the interviews were assessed to 
see whether they had a clear view of what populism is and what it means, 
and if they perceive it as something inherently negative, positive, or both, 
depending on the contexto 
Politic ians from most of the countries inclllded in our sample stated 
that populi m had illultiple, ften contradiet ry, meaning (e.g., Bul-
gari a, Denmark, Gree e Hungary Italy Orw, y Poland, Portugal, and 
Romania). The ambi ui ty oE th oncept, noteel by more rhan half of 
the interviewees, clearly reflects the current use of the word to refer to 
different and often contradictory matters such as far-right ideology and 
nationalism, citizen participation, advocacy for the people, Euroscepti-
cism, demagogy, empty rhetoric, exploitation of emotions, and so on. 
AIso adding to the ambiguity is the fact that in the politicians' descrip-
tions of populism there is also some propensity to label as populist aJl 
politicians and parties that have a more aggressive politicai strategy (e.g., 
openly confrontational with opponents, clearly aiming to convince vot-
ers at any cost), since they seem to be willing to do more than others to 
gain popularity and achieve power, but when asked to provide examples, 
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a Jarge majority oE poJiticians focu ed on the m t well-known cases of 
European P p~li m such as Marine Le Pen and the French a tiona l 
Front eer.t Wdders and r~e. ~aJ-ty f r Freeelom, 01' Dona ld Trump in rhe 
US.lnterestmgly Greek polltlclan referred I.nainly tO xamples in TlJ[key, 
Hungal'y a~l~ Poland, or even to Angela Merkel' p itiol1 ia relation to 
th Euro CfI I • 
An o~erwhe.lming mai.0rit~ of t/lese poliricians perceive popllli m a 
sornethmg malnly negaLl ve, lOc1uding ali pulitician inrerviewed from 
I30sll ia and Herzegovina and Romania. ln mo r other cOllnrrie the 
I'esll lt ,:el'e mixed ".'irh son~e politi ian rd rring to popllli m a being 
predommantly negative whde orber tated that chey per ive ir to be 
main ly ~ositive. A third grou.p tended to shap · thi answer according to 
the peclfic example chey had in l11ind. 
There i no~ethele a lear pattern to b noced in this particular as.pect 
oi che perceptlon of wha populi rn is and what ir entail . A x e ted in 
general, polirician from pOlulist politica i partie hav mo tlyas iar d 
pO~t~1i m witll .a po Ítive thange in demoeraric polities and wirh p itive 
politicai behavlOfs (e.g. Podemo in pain, FOl'za Italia and Lega ord in 
ltaly th~ HU;lgari~!1Jobbik the a.tional Ren wal Par:ty in P rtugal and 
the DaOlsh I eople Party). They vlew citem elve a rhe true democl'ats 
and rhe only one truly COI1 emed with th people and the people' inter-
ests a~ld 11 ed . Howeve~ ir is worrb n ting thar even for ome polirician 
~rom p~pt~ l i t p li tical parti populi m can be both negarive and p itive 
ln erra m mstan e. (e.g. Fide 7. in Hungary rhe Bulga rian Coaliti n Patri-
oti Front Syr.iza in reece M 5 in Iraly). Jntere tingly, in ome a e 
LI b a tlte on.~~gian Progre Party rhe P !ish party L and Ju tice 
ar the Greek polmeal parcy o!den DawJ1, which are widely considered 
and r~cogllized a P?pllli t, their politician haraeterized populism a 
nc?aclve. The mo r Iakely explanation for tbis is tbat they d nor a cept 
belOg.labeled a poplIli t because society in general perc i e p puli m 
negat l v~ l y and chey ~o \lOt wanr to be as oeiated \Vith th e negative 
p~'~eptl,on and entlments' 01', another p ibility i that the)' want to 
di tlngUlsh and distance them elv from orher kn wo national 01' inter-
nacional popu!i t politicai parties and leader . 
The definition of popll!i 111 provided by th se interviewces eonfirm thi . 
Although O ca . ion~lIy politician irom mainstream pareies recognized 
tbat t.he centralaty t th people .i.n poplllist policies i rhe pidt f democ-
racy It elf (and therdore something that init elf ha to be con idered 
p icive), anel 0r.ne poJitician fmm populi t partie alludecl to dema ogy 
and to th exclu Jonary nature f many populist id a is (e.g. the invariable 
pre ente oí out-group who e eomposirion hang nevertheless accord-
Ing to iele~l?gy ) as xpec.ted most politicial1 fl'Om mainstream parties 
gave ~efil1ltJ n of pOpU!1 m tbar presuppo ed negative perception of 
~ pl.tlt.m, . a~cl mo t politi.cians from populist parcies con id r d it posi-
tive 1I1 r!lell' Interpretation of whar populism i anel whar it mean today. 
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The most common themes in these politicians' definitions of what pop-
ulism is and what it means were thus mainly related to negative percep-
tions: deceitful rhetoric; demagogy; manipulation; deception; a strategy 
to gain power and win election . vaio promi e; implification o i .ues; 
misconceprion of rea lity· cxploitation of emotion llch as fe~r, anxlety, 
and resentm nt· aver ion [O mediatiou; and code words for racl m. Ab ve 
ali else, populi:m is perceived as a communication style and a politicai 
tyle based on opportuni fi and exploitati n of emotions to ga~n.power. 
Ir i n c frequently a sociated with p i'fie i sue and wher It I (e.g., 
orway), the i sue is mainly immigration. A ivic Platform MP fr·.om 
Poland, for example linked populi m directly to the fear of terrOrlSITI 
and outsiders'. 
The idea of populism as ideology as defined by, Canovan (2002), as a 
'paliti ai app ai co the peopl ' and the ' ideology of democraey', is pre. ~nt 
in the popuu r politicians' own perceptions of their approach to politlcs 
and i substanciat d in the following themes that are imultaneous ly posi-
tive perceptions of populism: 'a form of politics ,focus:d on ~he people:s 
interests and concerns' (M5S); 'speak the people s case (Dalllsh People s 
Party)· caring abont the people s rea l problem Uobbik)· and 'hegem . ny 
f che people ( yriza). Politicians from oppo ite side. a~d ideol?~l , 
right and leie of che politicai pectrum gave these very sJnlllar denmtlOll 
of populismo Podemo elf-percepti n i slightly different; it appe~l·s ro 
be parti. ularly fo u ed on chang~ in ciety and technology . m~e l~ per-
ceives popllli m mainly a a 'rea tlon to pro e e of moderlllzatL n and 
a form of popular mobilization. .. 
As we can observe, there are no notable differences accordlOg to reglOn 
in perceptions of populism from this sample of politicians: There are no 
marked differences across regions in Europe, north and south, west and 
east. There is also no clear dividing line between right- and left-wing 
populism, at least in what constitutes the way in which these politicians 
perceive populism. 
What Are the Consequences of Populism? 
For the vast majority of politicians interviewed across countries and main-
tream pareie', the effeet of populi m were negative. ~~wever, the~e were 
me exceptions. Although m re rare, there were po Itlve perceptJons of 
the impact f popuU m on demo racy which ~ere lar~ely . al:hough not 
exclnsively, confined to representatives o.f popult t partle, Imdar tO what 
we have already noted regarding perception of popllli m. . . . 
ln Hungary a politician belooging tO the rigbc-wing popllhsc pohcl-
cal party in gov nunent Fide z con idered populi.sm not to ~ave c . ~ e-
quence. ince ir wa , in hi view, a fearure embracmg me entlre P?~~lcal 
y tern.. 1 n particular, he de rib d it as an ef:fective tool for ali pohuclaos 
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being ~hrown into the fight of ~he elections which is dev id f any effects 
on saC1et~. ln Denmark, a Dalllsh People s Party poliei ian noted that po _ 
ulisr partles were a ch~~k .on ~Iected eljtes. !~:se view were ai o appar ~t 
fram a Lega Nor~ polItlclan m ltaly. polm lan of a center-right poptlli r 
party (Forza ltaha) also noted thae it may contribute to making known 
unhear~ needs o~ citizens. ln P rtugal the Na ti na l Renewal Part)' l'ep-
resentatlve percelVed populJsm as putting rhe nation fust. ln Bulgaria a 
palitician from the party Citizens for EUfopean Development of Bulga;.ia 
claimed that neoliberalism is more dangerous than populismo And in Nor-
way, the Progress Party provided a more nuanced view but one that was 
largely positive as well. There were no major differences between left- and 
right-wing populismo For example, in Spain a member of Podemos talked 
abour the positive effects of populism as putting the 'Iast ones in front of 
the first ones'. 
The interviewees were also asked specifically about what kind of effects 
populism and populists have. A wide range of effects Were mentioned, 
both in a negative and positive contexto Although there were no clear 
patterns, concerns tended to focus around societal impacts; in fact, the 
most commonly mentioned were some possible social effects. Social crises 
seem to be common (at least in the countries in our sample) and therefore 
a range of social effects were mentioned in the interviews. This kind of 
cri i ~ke n~any differenr forms but a/l dire rly affect the gua liry of pC()-
pies Ilfe: oCla l cha and citizen hip in 'vi.rrual' realit}' anel jn a deficienr 
demo.cr,a~)' marked by the ver-simpliflcation of public debate (Greece); 
? l anzatl~n (PoJ.and)· gen~ral socia l divi ion and conrr ntatiOll re ulting 
m a negative context of dlscouragement and frustration (Spain); dema-
gog~ and treatment of people as inferior (Portugal) or idiots (Hungary); 
declme of the public debate (Greece, Spain); as well as marginalization of 
significant issues (Italy). ln Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria inter-
viewees pointed to a possible growing intolerance among citizens' and a 
fracturing of societies. 
Some respondents mentioned specific politicaI effects. Politicians 
from the populist parties included in the study attribute populism to the 
~any weaknesses of democracy, such as the malfunctioning or destrllc-
tlOn of democratic institutions (Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik 
ln RUllgary respectively), irresponsible policies against the common 
good (Law and Justice in Poland), and inflated politicaI conflicts which 
render the formation of coalitians and governments a difficult process 
(Lega Nord in ltaly). 
ln three Southern Enropean countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), 
the rep~esentatlves fram the left-wing parties (Syriza, PSOE, and PCP, 
respectlvely) seem to share a common perspective: They associate the 
undemocratic forces derived from populism with a tendency of the politi-
cai sysrem to oversimplify issues, adversely affecting the public debate, 
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which is regarded harmful to democracy. But positive politicai effects 
were also mentioned in Poland: The perception of the positive aspect of 
populism is adopted by a left-wing politician (Demo rati Left Alliance) 
who considers populism to be a double-sided phenomenon, and its posi-
tive si de lies in the fact that it can assist politicai systems in addressing 
policy issues and implementing policy plans which would otherwise be 
difficult to address and implemento 
When the interviewees were asked to reflect on the consequences of 
populism borh for their own countrie and dero cracies m r widely 
a range of con cqucllces were menti n d for democ.ratic regime in gen-
eral and for their pecific countries. Q obvious pattem em rged amQng 
those interviewed, but the consequences of populisln are widely regarded 
by polirician as detrimenral t the effective funct'oning of democracy. 
With some exceptions, it e m. to be a positi n that goe beyond politi-
cai orientarioll. me ce p ndents spoke ab ut the undermining of rhc 
entire democratic process (the Greek politician from Golden Dawn, for 
example, cxplicitly ' tated chat democracy j not working dlle t popu-
lism). Other rai ed the specter of incre a ed polarization and conflicc 
across democra ie . some mentioned declining faith in d mo ra y and 
trust in politics, while still others pointed to the perennial simplification 
of complex factors that affect alI states. 
The consequences for specific countries were similar. Many mentioned 
social disorder and chaos and a wider fracturing of society as a risk to 
peace in extremis. Others noted increased polarization and a disillusion-
ment with national politics and politicians. Some of those interviewed also 
mentioned the negative effects of populism on the economy and what this 
might mean for democracy. But some pointed to positive consequences 
for their countries, including greater inclusivity and politicai engagement. 
ln addition, populism has, in some countries, led to a greater awareness 
of key is ue uch a immigration which could n longer be ignored by 
politicai elit . ln Spain a P demo p litician con idered thar eh re had 
been a re-politicization of society in luding a kind f rapprochcmcnt 
of people with politicians, resulting in further involvement of citizens in 
poliei aI life a we!! a in politicians' obligarions to chink about program 
and a pirarion more adapted to popular laims. ln Portugal the leader 
of the exerem right-wing popllli t party P R ( ational Renewal Party), 
argued that populism benefits national identity, social justice, national 
production, and security forces in the context of a democracy that requires 
corrections and repairs. 
ln sum, the interviewees' perspectives do conform to the commonly 
held expectation that populism has a negative impact on democracy; 
however, there are important exceptions in which populism is viewed 
as a response to ill-functioning institutions that brings the promise of 
revitalizing democracy. 
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What Explains the Popularity of Populist Leaders 
. ~ 
and Partles. 
rhe politicians interviewed characterized a situation in which populists 
have been more 01' less successful in describing problems in their national 
context and proposing sollltions. This means that, in their view, disil-
lusionment and disappointment with established parties and mainstream 
politicians, neglected voters, and real problems remaining unresolved are 
some of the most important reasons which explain why populists have 
been gaining electoral support in several European countries. While estab-
lished parties have failed to address significant issues such as immigration 
and social issues in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis in 
Europe, populist pareies and politicians have taken the opportunity to 
occupy the empty space. 
Politicai actors, particularly those from Eastern European countries and 
mainly from Hungary, maintain that the low levei oE education, dictator-
ship, and communist politicaI socialization have given leeway for populist 
politics and a popular demand for simple solutions. Disappointment with 
the establishment is not only directed towards national parties, but also 
towards European institutions such as the European Union: The more 
disappointed people are with mainstream national parties or the EU, rhe 
more vulnerable they appear to be to populismo 
To solve these problems, populist politicaI actors are offering new 
approaches to democratic politics and different models of government 
to ~h.e .disappoi~ted people, according to our interviewees. ln Norway, 
pOIItl.Clans descnbed populists as talented at describing and appealing to 
c.onflict, cr~ating div~ding lines to engage people based on their descrip-
Hon of socIety, and Identifying 'the others' who are different from 'us'. 
They argue that populists will say anything the people want to hear and 
anything that is popular and engaging to them. The interviewees also 
described ~opulists' adroit management of the complicated balancing act 
between tnggenng fear and offering hope as one of the reasons for their 
success: 'They know how to take advantage of the citizens' fears and 
anxieties' (Italy, Portugal) and 'playing with the most intense emotions 
and presenting themselves as saviours' (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
. Personal characteristics were not mentioned frequently by the politi-
clans to describe the reasons behind the popularity of populist leaders 
and parties. Charisma, which is often identified in the research literature 
(e.g., Weyland, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2002; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheep-
ers, 2002? ~at:v.'ell, 2004· Albertaz.zi & McDonnell, 2008) as a t:ypical 
chara~ten t! oE (successful ) poplIlist leaders, was hardly mentioned in 
these Intcrvlews. ln fact, personal characteri tics were not mentioned ar 
ali by the in~erviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Hungary, 
Poland, Spam, and Portugal. When per anal characteristics were men-
tlOned, populists were described either in terms of looks and personality 
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trajts charisma, rhetoric, or networking kiJl, uch as (iooks) amiable 
handsome (Bulgaria)' attractive (Greece); (charisma ) charm (Bulgaria); 
hari matic leader (Greece)· (rhetoric) attractive, but uperficial rhetori 
(Greece); communicate in a more lIndersrandable manner (Iraly); le.ad-
er fo ter people fear, people ' mOllthpiece and elite ar rhe same tllne 
(Tta ly); omml1nicate in a implified tabloid-style maoner (Norway)' (ttet-
working) connected to both left- and right-wing voters (Italy). 
With varying wei bt, four p li tical factor ar mentioned in expla-
nation of the popula.rity of populist leader and partie . Wc can divide 
them according to issues European Dnioll (EU) relation " ' the estab-
lished politicai y tem', and populists olutíons' : Fir t, among issues, 
example include references to th ethruc division 6f the country and the 
election y tem (Bosnia), mig 'ation and immigraeion (BlIlgaria orway) 
poveny (Bulgaria, Norway), and centralization ( orway), ali of which 
are pecifically mentioned by mo t of th interviewee in t}lese countries. 
econdly along those ame line EU relatioJls are repeatedly voiced as 
troubling either because of the orthl outh deavage in the EU (ltaly), 
EU and ATO relatiol1s (Bulgaria) oe that the EU m de of functioning 
ha di torted deJUocracy (P rtuga l). Thirdly critici m f the established 
politicaI system weighs in a a major politicai factor to explain. che popu-
larity of populí t ; factor include di appointment with majnstream par-
ties or the politicai y tem (Portugal,reece, ltaly, pain); established 
pareies have failed tO di cuss significant i sues ( Ol'way, Poland ); lack of 
ref rms (Spain); incapacity to fully implement poli ie (Gree e); ablle of 
p wer and corruption ( pain Italy)' and that p lí tical socia lization (as 
a communi t country) ha discouraged criticai debate (Hungary) . Fourth 
and la dy, popl-tlists solu.tiol1S are m ntioned as au importam factor. ln 
thi r gard, incerviewee argued thar populi ts are addr ssing i su of 
cancero f l' many peopl.e (Italy, rway), a well as reaching out to those 
neglected by ather partie (oJ'way). evertheles, it wa ai o men.tioned 
that populists are making unreali tic electoral promise (Romania, Portu-
ga l) and that they are destroying past con en tiS on whi h the tatu quo 
was based (Greece). 
Social and economic causes were also mentioned by these interview-
ees a potencial explanatory factor for the success of populist actors . 
Although there are difference iu th empha is placed on specific aspect 
of economic hard hip its impact on ocial grievances i reflected in 
most interviews, with the exception of the Northern European countries 
included in our sample. Tbe tronge t tatemenr are provided by Bo nian 
and Romanian politicians, who spoke abour p verty and unemployment 
as the major o ial force driving support for populi m. Ali the Bll.lgarian 
politi ian argued that popuü m i linked to poverty w hich permeate 
ocio-political i ues. Alo, in Poland, eial welfare is ue ' and unequal 
redistribution of the effects of economic modernization were noted as 
important factors. 
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Many Southern European countries' interviewees linked sorne of the 
causes behind the success of populism to the economic crisis. The rise of 
popuUsr partie wa explained by the un,employment and fear of becom-
ing periphera l (Italy), the economi cri i and inability of the in titutional 
structLU'e to deal with it (Spain) economic insecw'ity and social uncer-
taiJlty (Greec ), and oVeI'all ocial dissati faction and economic hardship 
(Portuga l). Greek poUricians even .referred to rea l problem faced by the 
population as the genuine rea on b hind the succ s of populi m. 
Additi nally ame of the politicians incerviewed, maillly f1' m Hungary 
an.d Romania, have ai a related economic hard hip and poverty tO the 
low levei oi ed u ation al110ng ection of the electorate, wbjçh makes 
some people uncritical and more prone to believe in this type of electoral 
promise. Other politicians placed more emphasis on country-specific eth-
nic problems, for example, stigmatization and scapegoating of various 
minorities, i.e., Roma people ar immigrams, as a tool for building politi -
cai capital (Romania), or specific, long-la ting inter-ethnic conflict (Bo n.ia 
and Herzegovina). 
The role of mainstream and social media as a factor io the popularity 
of populist actors was I1Jentioned in several countries. The imerviewees 
des ribed difierem siruations . On the one hand news media actively 
engag in populism in their new coverage through the u e of popu li r 
trategies: for example, ome poLitician (e.g., HlIogary, orway, Por-
tugal) referced to appealing ritle and tabloid implicirya importam 
facrors facilitating rh popularity of populi m wbile implined dichoto-
mizations and the over-personalization of politicai leaders were men-
tioned by interviewees from 1taly and Romania. On the other hand, the 
cases in which news media simply cover populist politicai actors were 
also mentioned. A Spanish politician assessed this as a failure of the 
media system, but it was also cOllsidered both a structuraI, inadvertent 
effect of news values, as well as a consequence of commercialization 
and an attempt to garner mOre alldien,ce attention by overing the most 
spectacular a pect of party poliric (Norway Portugal). Or, simply, it 
wa a a result of ucces fuI po.litical commllni a tion strategie by skill-
fui p jiticians (Portugal). 
Some of these politicians have also emphasized the deliberate decision 
of specific news outlet tO openly upport populist politicaI actor uch 
as the ~olish pl1blic media. The Hllngarian politician member of J~bbik 
recogruzed the weight of politicaI control over rhe m dia which coerces 
journali r into pr moting th idesz agenda, rhus providing Fidesz witb 
extr.a sa li~nce and medi.a vjsibi.lity. A simllar sirllation was reporred by 
the mtervlewees Irom Bulgaria where the politicization oi new media i 
an issue (Raycheva & Peicheva, 2017). 
. Finally, the role of social media in amplifying populi m wa also empha-
slzed (e.g., Gl'eece, Portugal, pain, Poland). Becall e oeial media allows 
for direct communicatiol1 withou[ barriers and in bypa sing gateke p rs 
i1 
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it contributes to augmentation of the visibility and, in some cases, the 
appeal of populists. 
Although other more specific and country-related factors were also 
mentioned by these politicians (such as, for example, the efficient organi-
zation of populist parties (Spain) 01' the religious slogans used by populist 
politicians to attract support in the most traditional sectors of society 
(Romania)), they have clearly highlighted the effects of economic and 
politicai representation crises, as well as of communication and media 
factors, as causes explaining the success of populist actors. 
, 
What Social Issues Are Most Related to Populis~? 
ln and of itself, populism does not need to be tied to ~pecific social issues 
in the politicai debate. That is, by defining a politicai actor as populist, one 
has not implicitly defined which social issues that politicai actor primarily 
campaigns on. Populist politicians often argue that they address popular 
grievances and opinions that are supposedly ignored by governments, 
traditional parties, and mainstream media in order to show that they are 
on the side of the people (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). Often politicians will 
not define the people, but the appeal to 'the people' will be demonstrated 
in their campaign, to show how they would defend them from outsiders 
01' economic downturns (see, e.g., Csigó & Merkovity, 2017; Stanyer, 
Salgado, & Strõmbiick, 2017; see also the introduction to this volume). 
Yet, some social issues may be more suitable to populistic politicai 
campaigning than others . First, immigration as an issue in public debate 
is often tied to anti-globalization policies where the main goal of the 
politicians is to defend 'national' or 'traditional' values. When this topic 
is used, the 'us' and 'them' politicai rhetoric becomes evident. Moreover, 
the issue is often linked to economic questions because (im)migrants are 
seen as a problem and politicai discourse often turns into debate about 
immigrants exploiting the welfare system and committing crime (Rydgren, 
2004, pp. 485-486; Wodak, 2015, pp. 46-69). 
Another important issue linked to populism is the economy itself. 
Recently, we have seen major economic upheaval in the Western world, 
e.g., the financial crisis beginning in 2007-2008, which was followed by 
the Euro crisis. During these crises, politicians were often faced with the 
dilemma caused by a clash between long-term economic interests and 
short-term benefits. Previous research has argued that populist politicai 
actors ignore this dilemma by focusing on short-term benefits (Gál, 2011, 
p. 159). Crises and economic uncertainty are considered important rea-
sons behind the emergence and success of some forms of populism (e.g., 
Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Salgado & Stavrakakis, 2018). 
We therefore expected populist politicians, in particular, to focus 
mainly on immigration and the economy. To examine this expectation, 
politicians were asked the following question: 'Which social issues are 
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most related to populism in your country?'. ln line with our expecta-
tions, the economy-including poverty, social-economic inequality, and 
corruption-wa mentioncd frequenrly by politicians in the majority of 
the a mpled countries (including Bulgaria, Denmark reece, Hungary, 
Italy orway Poland, Portugal, R mania, and pain). AI o in line with 
Qur expecration, (im)migration and ethJJic differen e. w re freql1emly 
mentioned acro s numerous countries (includjng Bo rua and Herzegovina, 
Dennlark, Gr cee, Hungary, Italy, Norway Poland, and Portugal ). Ofren 
the immigration debate is linked to a debate about the European Union, 
which wa mentioned by Bulgarian, Danish, and Polish politicians. Less 
fren, welfare i . ues such as childcare or healthcare were mentioned by 
rhe . pol itician . 
Immigration and the economy are interna tional topics that could origi-
nate from the so-called European (im)mi rarion crisis of 2015 or the 
financial crisis beginning in 2007-2008. Yet, it is important not to over-
look substantial differences across countries and their historical roots. For 
instance, Hungary was one of the countries most severely affected by the 
migration crisis (see, for example Thorpe, 2017). This circumstance was 
exploited by populist parties, namely by Fidesz and partly by Jobbik. Yet 
th !-J uogarian media outlets were alxeady divided long before rhe migra-
tion cri i with one . ection of the media pl'oviding a platfo.rm for popu.list 
sty/ccomn1lllli ation (incJuding 011 topie related to imn)jgration), and the 
other section split between adapting to a populist and simplified debate 
or a criticai approach, but in the latter case likely facing consequences 
(e.g., refusal of interviews 01' rejection of factual information on certain 
issues). The Hungarian interviewee cmphasized chat Fide z wa partly 
re ponsible for the previously mentioncd media environnl,ent (simplifiea-
tion, lack of eritiei m in maio tream media etc.) because the el ctorate 
were resonating positiveJy with anti-immigrant messages, which served 
Fidesz's aim to be re-elected. 
Ti mention other exampl.e immi ration has been disCll ed in populi t 
term fox evel'aJ decades in Deumark (Bachler &H pmann,201.7). ince 
at l.ea r th late 19905, immi >rati n ha beeo one of the major p liti ai 
j sues in Danish polities learly linked to the ri e of the Dani h People's 
Parry foullded in 995 but ai driven by a number f individual puo-
dir who were given aee to oew papers op-ed page . Immigxation bas 
emerged as thc mo t d ei iv i sue in Dani. h el.ection ampaigns since at 
lea [2001, yer we h ve not witoe ed a polarization of rhe Dani b media 
land ape 01' of pl1blic opinion a we have in Hllngary. ln B oia ancl 
F:1erzego vina the politica i debate i le c ncerned with reeem migra-
ti n but more with the Ol1teomes of eh 1995 Dayton Agreel1l,em anel ir 
power-sharing acro the ultura lly and r ligiou ly diver e populatioll oC 
Bosnia and H rzegovi_na. 
L.a0king in more detail at the politicians' answers to our study, two 
notlCeable results emer e. First, the answers provided by the políticians 
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did not reveal systematic differences between populist and non-populist 
actors within the analyzed countries. That is, both the group of politi-
cians typically described as non-populist and those considered populist 
stated that populist politicai communication is mainly concerned with 
immigration or the economy. Second, in response to the question about 
what are the drivers of the populist politicai debate, the vast majority of 
politicians across countries see these issues as a cause for populism. That 
is, the reasoning appears to be that certain issues on the politicai agenda, 
such as immigration, for example, clearly call for a populist politicai style. 
A reverse reasoning, arguing that it is populist actors who promote issues 
such as immigration because they accord with a populist style of com-
munication, did not receive support from those interviewed. 
ln short, across the sampled countries, issues rela.ting to the economy 
(crises and economic uncertainty) and migration were most often per-
ceived to be related to populism. Moreover, the politicians argued that 
these issues cal! for a populist style, rather than arguing that certain issues 
are promoted if they lend themselves more to a populist style of politicai 
communication. 
What Role Do the Media Play in Populism? 
As well as exploring politicians' perceptions of politicai populism, we 
were also seeking to understand whether politicians believed that popu-
Iism extends beyond the politicai realm and is considered to be a feature 
of their country's media environment. ln particular, we wished to exam-
ine whether politicians view media outlets themselves as being populist 
and whether media outlets in their country are supportive, or criticai 
of, populist actors. ln examining their responses, we sought to identify 
commonalities and differences in views related to politicians' place on the 
politicai spectrum and whether they were in government or in opposition. 
Politicians were questioned on their views regarding whether or not 
leading media outlets were supportive or criticaI of populism, and if 
they consider that media outlets themselves behave in a populist manner. 
Their responses enabled us to understand further details about politicians' 
perceptions of the relationship between the media and populist politi-
cians, namely, whether populist politicai actors are in fact covered by 
the media; whether they believe that the dominant perspective, if there is 
one, is primarily criticai or supportive of politicai actors in either leading 
and/or populist media, and the reasons they consider this to be so; and, 
finally, whether they consider that leading media cover populist actors in 
a populist way. 
Most politicians in most countries reported that populist politicai 
actors are indeed covered by the media, with the exception of Bulgaria, 
where only one centrist opposition politician thought that this was not the 
case. Asked whether the dominant perspective of this coverage by leading 
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media outlets was criticaI the majority of po.liticians from B nia, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, and ha lf of the Bulgarjan intervi wee 
considered ir to be llncritical. However, in orne case, even if th cov rage 
was considered t be uncritical, it wa ugge ted that ic unintentionally 
works in favor of the populi t agenda becau e of its over-simplified and 
en ational character, aimed ar attracting higher ratings. A variery of rea-
son were offered for the media's uncrirical stance, inclllding e onomkally 
weak media (Bosma) a dy funccional media ystem (Hungary), rhe align-
rnent of the media' new value witb p pulis! commllnicati 11 (Poland), 
and p li tica l in crllm ntalization (Bosnia). M t p lirician hom Den-
mark, Icaly, Poland, Spain, P reugal, and orway, and half of the Bulgar-
ian interviewees, con idered the media to be generally criticai of popuLists. 
Politician Í1'om Iraly anel Spain ar ued tbar a criticaI per pective wa 
conoected to th capacity of the media to be objective and independent. 
Mediai n Bo nia, Greec Hungary, P land and R mania wece con-
sidered by politicians Eram the e countries to be upportive of po uli t 
poliei ai act r . Two main rcasol1 wexe given by tbe interviewee for 
media upport. Th fi1' c wa a form of dependency on the politicaI phere 
derived Erom either financial 01' ideol gical factors. T hi s reason wa 
empha ized by politicians from more rhan balf of the countries illcluded 
in om research (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria reece, Hungary, 
Iraly, Poland, and Portugal). The ther main reasoo offered for media 
supporr, indirect 0 1' otherwisc, of populi t politicai actor wa related to 
the form, style, and narra tive ad pted by media utlets so thac a cord-
ing to a Portugue e politi ian, 'p pulist p litical atol' make ood front 
pa es and headlines that eU and, according tO a Norwegi.an politician, 
popnli ts fit so well imo what is t he media s parameters' 01' as one Greek 
politician sta ted 'moderation does not sell'. 
Among rhe ba ic charact ristic f media coverage noted by many inter-
viewee i an emphasi on hort catchy di kbait-type headlines, coo mllch 
focu 00 trategy and per onalities and tOO li rtle on ub tantive politi 
(Bo aia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Poland and Portugal). Accordjng tO 
a Polish politi ian che media provide a implified vision of reality llSing 
langllage which bolsters populism-a view also shared by politicians from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria, HLU1gary, Italy, and orway. P li tician 
Irom Italy were particularly criticai of wbac they thought t b superfi ial 
and pool'-qualj ey media new coverage. 1edia upport for popllli t actors 
wa ai o attributed to the competi tive pre ure being brouglu to bear on 
traditional new outlets by an inc1'ea in Iy fragmented media landscape 
and fierce compctition for audience hare ( ree e). 
Policician were also expLicitly a ked wherher they beli ved che media in 
tbeir country co be populist, 01' whether main tl'eam media covered event 
in a populist way and if so which. A nUll1ber of incerviewee named media 
outlets chey believe to be populist including politician from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Denmark Greece, Hungary Ita ly Norway Poland, Portugal 
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Romania and Spain. ln rhe ca e of Greece only the repr entative of the 
two populi t parties considered this to be the a. e. Thi wa ai . t(ue of 
pain. M t f the media named are in privare hand . ho~ ... ever. 10 o.n~e 
ca (Bo rua and Herzegovina, Hungary and Poland) publlc erVl e medIa 
were also rh u ht to have ad pted a populi t t}r1e. Every Huo arian politi-
cian on idered the cOllntry' leading media to be poplllist in Illding dle 
publi servic broael a ' ter which they ele ribed a gov rnment media. 
Mo t poütician Irom Bulgaria anel Spain, on the other hal1~. reported th~t 
they did not believe that there are p puli t media or thar malll tream media 
c ver i ue in a populist manner. However: a panish pol iti ian rated thar 
the media ar 'unwittingly playing the populi ts' game by over-simpl ifying 
the p litical c nversati n (I r a different approach on lactors that promote 
popuLi m in the media, ee Mamer et a\. in rhi volum ). 
Om findings I ad t the foll wing conclu i ns. Politi ian from aero 
Europe, in governmenr or in oppoition and from almo t ev ry ideologi-
ai tripe regard the media as increa iogly adopting, or having al:e~dy 
ad pred, new value which are popu li t-underst od a over-sll11pll fymg 
an I nsationalizing coverage-and therefore contribute to populi r poh-
tics. Politicians identified with some populist parties, however, do not 
ac ept this under tanding of populi ·111. ln Spaio and Portugal, for exam-
pie politicians identified with p puli 111 from widely diverse ideologkal 
Iamilies (left-wing in the formeI" a e aod right-wing in the latter) argue 
that mainstream media reject populism and that this is a cause for regret. 
They argue that truly populist media are of the people. ln general, how-
ever, politicians are concerned that populist-in a negative sense-news 
coverage is intensifying, while criticai and high-quality politicai coverage, 
understood as objective and independent reporting, is decreasing. 
There is also widespread concern in countries as varied as Denmark and 
Hun ary that th m dia are either insufficiently criticai, utter1y uncritical, 
or supportiv of populi ta torso A Danish liberal-right counterpart tated 
that she considcrs the media to b 'supportive to such an exrent that I 
become furious about it'. Politicians from former communist countries 
(Bosnia and H rzegovina Hungary, and Poland) attribute this uncrirical 
and/or supporti e tane to the politi a i instrumentalization of the media 
and clickbait approach to politi , while poliri ians Erom Northern and 
Southern European countries (Denmark, Norway, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) attribute it more to a tabloid approa h to politics. However, the 
outcome is, in their view, similar: reinf rcement of the populist agenda 
with the attendant problematic implications for liberal democracy. 
Conclusion 
A first noteworthy conclusion is that, although the sample inc!udes coun-
tries from different parts of Europe with different experiences of populist 
politics and varying amounts of eJectoraJ success, as well as different types 
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of populism, there are no clear di cernible patterns in these European 
regions regarding how politicians perceive populism, its consequences, 
and explanatory reasons, as weU as the role of the media in spreading or 
containing populism. There seems to be some general consensus, however, 
regarding the issues that are most related to populist approaches to poli-
tics in Europe, namely immigration and economic hardship, which are 
in tum Iinked more recently to the migration crisis and the financial and 
economic crises (see ais o the introduction to this volume). 
From among the various results obtained through this study based 
on interviews, it is interesting to note thar charisma is not considered 
an important component of populism in Europe. Extant Jiterature often 
relates charisma with crises, presenting the larter as opportunities for 
charismatic leaders to engage in simple, emotional, politicai communica-
tion that exploits peoples' anxiety and fears and offers straightforward, 
uncomplicated solutions to problems (e.g., EatweU, 2004). Regardless, 
at least as politicians across these different regions in Europe perceive it, 
the spread of populism in Europe is not Iinked to the politicians' personal 
characteristics, and particularly not to charisma. 
These politicians have ,mainJy pointed to the malfunctioning and even 
failure of estabJished democratic institutions, inc!uding mainstream politi-
cai parties, in addressing problems and in producing convincing discourse 
and solutions as one of the main reasons behind the development of popu-
lism in Europe. AIternative politicai proposaIs then have a fertile ground 
upon which to grow and capitalize on existing crises. ln fact, our sample 
of interviewees referred to the migration crisis and the Euro crisis as being 
the main issues exploited by current popuJist politicai actors in Europe. 
These politicians have aIs o pointed to broad understandings of popu-
lism, from ideology (democracy, left and right) to communication and 
politicaI styIe and strategy. But populism is usually perceived as something 
inherently negative, either because it is based on over-simplified (mis) 
conceptions of reaIity, or because it is deliberately intended to deceive. 
There are, however, some exceptions, especially from populist politicians, 
that Iink populism to the roots of democraey (sovereignty of the people) 
and perceive it as a Iogical response to an ill-functioning system. lt is aIso 
noteworthy that the notion 'corrupt elites', often present in definitions of 
populism, was not emphasized by these politicians, probabIy as a result 
of the presence of seIf-serving bias. 
A lingering disillusionment with polities was also presented as an 
explanation of the success of populist politicai actors, as well as a nega-
tive consequence of populism. Given the perceptions of populism as 
over-simplifieation of issues and vain promises, for example, it should 
be no surprise that eitizens would aIso feel disappointed with populist 
parties and governments, in addition to being disillusioned with main-
stream politics. However, some of the interviewees have also referred to 
contradietory positive consequences of popuIism as greater inc!usivity 
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and politicai engagement. Different types of populism as well as different 
effects of populist discourse on citizens (for further insight into the effects 
of populism on citizens, see the theoretical chapter by Hameleers et aI. 
in this volume) might easily explain the contradictory perceptions of the 
consequences of populism. 
The media, both mainstream and social media, are also seen as an 
important part of the equation by these politicians. Factors such as the 
instrumentalization of the media by populist governments (e.g., Hungary, 
Poland) or high market competition and commercialization objectives 
(identified everywhere) are usually seen as determinants heightening the 
salience attributed to populist actors and to theiti messages in politicai 
news coverage. Additionally, mainstream media were also seen as respon-
sible for facilitating an environment of over-simplified and distorted polit-
icaI debate, due to some of their news values and personalization (overall 
tabloidization), which fits perfectly with populist politicai styles and tends 
therefore to result in more media exposure for populist politicai actors. 
Social media, as a means through which to communicate directly with 
citizens, bypassing mainstream media gatekeepers, allows a conveyance 
of non-mediated, user-generated content, and has a great deal of influence 
on facilitating an environment conducive to increased polarization and to 
greater levels of populism (see also Salgado, 2018). 
ln sum, this study of the perceptions politicians hold of populism has 
shown that, although this sample includes politicians from different 
types of politicai parties and countries that have experienced various 
leveis of success of populism as well as different types of populism, 
there seems to be strong similarity in their views. Populism is mainly 
perceived as something negative and with damaging consequences for 
democracy; there is a crisis of politicaI representation and a crisis of 
democratic values that seem to be opening up space for alternative, and 
sometimes, extremist, politicaI actors; and the media are not seen as a 
neutral bystander. 
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~Hlonal Ren~wal ~arty, oClah r Parry Social Democratic Pany· Romania : 
Thepcll10<7a~e U~lon oE. th~ HlIJlgarians in ~omani.a, Social Democratic Parr)', 
Na:,o?al LtbeHlll arry UIl.lon Save ROlllama· pall1: People's Parry pani h 
SocJa" r Workers' Party ClUdadano, Podemo. Anonymüy wa nor an isslIe 
fOf .mosr .of thcse poliricians except in the a e of Bulga ria and Poland, where 
ali rncervlewe have reque ted char their names n t be disclosed. 
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